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This book is thorough, rigorous, and understandable, pulling together 
a coherent analysis of many strands in the literature on the economics 
of international transfer payments. While there is some appeal to data 
and to the potential relevance of various assumptions, the book is 
primarily one of theory. It does not deal with empirical issues of when 
and where critical distortions might actually exist.
 
After a brief discussion of large international transfers in the past, 
Brakman and van Marrewijk suggest that the attention paid to the 
topic in general and to the German reparations after World War I in 
particular can be attributed to the debate in the Economic Journal 
between Keynes and Ohlin about the consequences of those 
reparations. Interestingly, in this debate Ohlin was the Keynesian who 
stressed the income effects of a transfer on demand while Keynes was 
more concerned with the relative-price, or terms-of-trade, effects. The 
authors stress that the lack of a formal analysis made the discussion 
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unnecessarily complicated.
 
The overriding concern throughout the book is to assess the welfare 
effects of a transfer on both the recipient and the donor under a variety 
of conditions. To make the analysis more relevant to current issues, 
the authors point out that in recent years foreign aid is an important 
form of international transfer.
 
Chapter 3 starts with a geometric illustration of the following claim: 
“Example 1 (Leontief). It is possible to construct an example 
involving two goods and two countries under perfect competition such 
that a transfer from one country to the other paradoxically benefits the 
donor and hurts the recipient” (p. 36). The authors then introduce 
duality theory, which is used extensively throughout the book. With a 
simple three equation model, they prove “Samuelson’s theorem” to 
the effect that Leontief’s paradox is not possible under conditions of 
Walrasian stability. This analysis also shows that any terms-of-trade 
effects depend on relative marginal propensities to consume.
 
Subsequent chapters systematically modify the basic model to analyze 
the effects of various complications. The authors are very good about 
attributing specific results to particular contributors. Chapter 4 shows 
that the introduction of public goods, non-traded goods, or many 
goods does not alter the result that the donor loses and recipient gains 
from an international transfer in a two-country, Walrasian-stable 
economy.
 
Chapter 5 is provocatively titled “Clouds on the Horizon I: 
Distortions.” With costs of administration, existence of 
unemployment, lobbying incentives, or tariffs, for example, 
Samuelson’s theorem may not always hold. It may fail under 
situations with backward-bending offer curves or inferior goods.
 
Chapter 6 deals with third parties or “bystanders.” Adding a third 
country is not a trivial extension, although once again transfer 
paradoxes, with donor enrichment or recipient impoverishment 
generally require backward-bending offer curves or inferior goods.
 
Chapter 7 addresses an interesting issue. Can the approach be used to 
justify the existence of multilateral agencies by showing when there 
are welfare gains from multilateral rather than bilateral aid? The 
answers turn out to hinge on relative marginal propensities to consume 
particular goods. Part of the chapter raises a question about the 
incentives for the existence of aid itself and postulates a “meta” 
welfare function in which the welfare of potential recipients enters 
into the donor’s welfare function. The decision to give aid can then be 
treated as an optimization problem.
 
Chapter 8 looks at data on the extent of tied aid relative to untied aid 
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for ten large donor countries in different years. The extent of tying of 
aid varies widely from country to country. Estimates in the literature 
of the limited extent to which tied aid actually changes a donor’s 
exports suggests to the authors that tied aid is not effective in general; 
so, after discussing the analytics of tied aid in which transfer 
paradoxes are possible, they turn to what is called “forced choice” 
approach. The welfare effects do not appear to be much changed by 
this latter approach.
 
Chapter 9 represents something of an analytical departure from other 
chapters that use the duality approach. It introduces imperfect 
competition. In this model, a “love of variety” effect may, depending 
on elasticities of substitution, dominate the more familiar terms-of-
trade and direct-income effects of an international transfer. Finally, 
Chapter 10 addresses a few dynamic issues. A mathematical appendix 
reviews results from duality theory.
 
Overall, this book is a useful reference for anyone concerned with 
theory underlying the welfare effects of international transfers.
 
JOHN A. CARLSON
Purdue University
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The transfer problem is one of the oldest economic problems 
discussed by many classical and contemporary economists. 
Considering the enormous amount of overseas development 
assistance, many people may agree that not only does the transfer 
problem have a long history but that it is also a lively academic 
subject. However, while most textbooks of international economics 
devote one chapter to the subject, there have been surprisingly few 
comprehensive books in the past, at least to the reviewer’s knowledge, 
which focus on it from the theoretical viewpoint. 
 
Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk have made a good 
contribution to the subject by publishing a well-written book. Chapter 
1 gives a concise history of international transfers, ranging from the 
implications of David Hume’s argument on pricespecie-flow 
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mechanisms for the transfer problem to a brief discussion about the 
German transfer problems after the destruction of the Berlin Wall. The 
main purpose of the historical review is to point out that the emphasis 
of the transfer problem has been shifted from balance-of-payments 
adjustment to the welfare effects of transfers, the main issue of this 
book. Chapter 2 summarizes the famous debate between John 
Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin concerning the reparation payments 
after World War I. One of the purposes of this chapter is to exemplify 
the importance of formal analysis. Chapter 3 presents a simple formal 
model to prove and discuss the central theorem of this book, which 
they call Samuelson’s theorem: “In a perfectly competitive, two-good, 
two-country and Walrasian-stable world the donor always loses and 
the recipient always gains as a result of a transfer. The donor’s terms 
of trade deteriorate, causing a ‘secondary burden’ if, and only if, the 
donor’s marginal propensity to consume its own export good is lower 
than the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume the donor’s export 
good” (quoted from pp. 44–5).
 
Using a simple two-country model, Brakman and van Marrewijk 
suggest that the difference in opinion between Keynes and Ohlin 
could have been made more transparent if they had made use of the 
modern trade model based on duality theory. Chapter 4 extends 
Samuelson’s theorem to take into account public goods, nontraded 
goods, and an arbitrary but finite number of traded goods. The 
following three chapters discuss the possibility that Samuelson’s 
theorem does not hold. Chapter 5 shows that transfer paradoxes (i.e., 
donor-impoverishment and/or recipient-enrichment) may arise under 
the presence of distortions like the cost of administration, sticky 
wages, rent-seeking activities, and tariffs. Chapter 6 is a review of the 
well-known result due to Gale (1974) that Samuelson’s theorem is 
vulnerable to the existence of a bystander country and introduces the 
economic interpretation of this result which was originally presented 
by Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983). Chapter 7 considers a trade 
model in which the donor, recipient, and bystander countries are all 
multiple in order to show that generally donor and recipient countries 
prefer bilateral transfers to multilateral ones through international 
organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. They also outline the 
(general) impossibility of strict Pareto-improving differential 
multilateral transfers which was originally presented by Turunen-Red 
and Woodland (1988). Chapter 8 shows that tied aid can be another 
source of transfer paradox by introducing the argument in the works of 
Murray C. Kemp and Shoichi Kojima (1985a,b, 1987), and then that 
under Albert Schweinberger’s “forced choice” approach (1990) to tied 
aid the paradox is impossible. Chapter 9, which is based on the 
authors’ original contribution (Brakman and Van Marrewijk, 1995), 
basically shows that the main result of the previous chapter can be 
carried over to a model of monopolistic competition. Chapter 10 
briefly discusses a way of incorporating dynamic optimization into the 
economics of transfers.A concise and clear review of some duality 
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concepts follows as a Mathematical Appendix.
 
The book has many virtues. First, the argument in it is very clear, 
perhaps owing to the adoption of a unified framework throughout the 
book. Second, it covers the welfare effects of international transfer, 
and it provides a useful guidance for any researcher who wants to 
contribute to this research field.Third, the mathematics used in the 
book is not too advanced, and the book should be readable by many 
nontechnical readers without difficulty. Fourth, almost all propositions 
which appear in the book are standard. I believe that students learning 
the theory of international trade will benefit from carefully reading 
this book.
 
The book has another virtue, certainly a virtue in oriental societies like 
my country. It seems to me that the authors are possibly a little bit too 
modest to make explicit and assert their own original view on the 
transfer problem. I would like to conclude this review by raising 
several points on the transfer problem that are not fully discussed in 
the book.
 
First, it seems that one of the serious problems in overseas 
development assistance is that a transfer improves the welfare of only 
a small portion of people in the recipient country, perhaps the richest 
and socially strongest portion. That is, even if we consider a two-
country framework, the donor and recipient countries, there are three 
types of agents—donor, recipient, and bystander—the last of which 
consists of most residents in the recipient country. In such a context, 
the three-agent model originated in Gale might be more relevant.
 
Second, the economic analysis of political process may be necessary 
for the problem of transfer. I have personally come to believe the 
importance of it after experiencing the Kobe earthquake in January 
1995. After the earthquake took place, Kobe City Council and other 
local councils near Kobe received a large amount of money from 
overseas and from other parts of Japan. However, most of the big 
donations were left unused for a long time! That is mainly because the 
local governments were not able to find a politically agreeable way of 
spending the money on Kobe residents. 
 
Third, perhaps by mentioning the welfare economics of customs 
union, the authors could say a little more in Chapter 7. Finally, we can 
interpret the Kemp–Wan proposition (1976) as saying that a Pareto-
improving multilateral transfer is possible if it involves the imposition 
of a common tariff vector by a part of trading countries.
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